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Moreover, she recycles a narrative whereby I have concocted the term Islamic feminism and trapped her in its web.
In the 1990s-a good decade before Barlas appeared on the scene-some Muslim women in Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa-including, for example, Iranian legal anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini, who went on to become a leading scholar of Islamic feminism-observed an emergent phenomenon they simultaneously and spontaneously called "Islamic feminism." I was eager to know more. As a historian, I had previously researched early twentieth-century feminism in Egypt that Muslim and Christian women had jointly created. It was often referred to in Egypt as "secular feminism," indicating its nationalist frame. This feminism was informed by religious ideals, especially as enunciated by Islamic modernism, and affirmed the equality of all citizens (whatever their religious identity). The Muslim women in the late twentieth century who first drew attention to emergent Islamic feminism were liberals, progressives, and feminists; they were known as "secular" because they did not employ religious language in their public discourse. The label "secular" did not imply being anti-Islam or deficiently Muslim.
Islamic feminism articulated a gender-egalitarian Islam based on rereadings of the Qur'an and other religious sources. It sparked considerable attention from day one and was both enthusiastically welcomed and defiantly contested. As a label of identity, "Islamic feminist" was especially contentious, and for many years, women who produced what was seen as Islamic feminist discourse firmly rejected the label. In time, however, many came to accept it, such as African American theologian and author of the groundbreaking Qur'an and Woman, amina wadud. Barlas casts "feminism" as a "master narrative" born and bred in the West. She ignores that "feminism" was born in "the West" and "the East" simultaneously in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and that anticolonial nationalist discourses were integral to the feminisms in the East, which Muslims, together with other compatriots, constructed.
5 Nonetheless, having made her disaffection with the idea of Islamic feminism emphatically known, Barlas could have simply turned her back on the idea of Islamic feminism, avoided future association with it, and looked for more agreeable contexts in which to present her work. She did not do this, but rather used (and continues to use) the platform "Islamic feminism" provided.
In her JFSR roundtable essay, Barlas repeats the claim that I imposed the label "Islamic feminism" on her work. In making her case, she refers to a simple definition of Islamic feminism that I offered during a January 2002 talk in Cairo. Later, when she learned of this, she granted the cogency of my definition and even its applicability to her work, although she herself would not use the term itself. In her JFSR essay, referring to the definition I offered in the Cairo talk, she claims that it "ignored that wadud and I had openly resisted the name [Islamic feminism] and also papered over some of our [hers and wadud's] theological and methodological differences.'" 6 Yet the definition of Islamic feminism she refers to was offered in the Cairo talk delivered before her book appeared, and thus, before I became acquainted with Barlas's work.
In the same JFSR essay, Barlas asserts that as a result of my work, the Islamic feminist label "has stuck, which means I find it hard to respond to critiques of my own work without speaking on behalf of 'Islamic feminism' since the two are now inextricably linked." 7 Now, something strange is going on. Barlas tells us in her roundtable essay that she must defend Islamic feminism (which continues to rattle her) in order to defend her own work. Yet, in defending her work, she also attacks Islamic feminism. Apart from the absurdity, I, for one, find this a pity; among other things, it detracts from the valuable contributions Barlas's work makes.
Contrary to Barlas's protestations in her essay, her work is not "inextricably linked" to Islamic feminism. Many who are attracted to her work, she should be happy to know, are simply interested in her liberatory reading of the Qur'an. Since she is so uncomfortable with the association of her work with Islamic feminism, why does she take it upon herself to defend Islamic feminism?" "Islamic feminism" does not need Barlas, to use her words, "to speak on behalf of" it.
which to detail those misrepresentations. For my keynote at Tampere, which overviewed the emergence and spread of Islamic feminism, see Badran, "Engaging Islamic Feminism, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] See Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World (London: Zed, 1986). 6 Barlas, "Secular and Feminist Critiques of the Qurʾan," 112. 7 Ibid., emphasis added.
Islamic feminism, with its three-decades-old history, is complex, complicated, dynamic. It invites thoughtful, creative engagement. Barlas could save herself the trouble of going on the defensive. She could avoid it entirely, carry on with her hermeneutic project, and seek venues other than those given to addressing Islamic feminism for airing her work. She appears ever ready, however, to continue sharing the stage with Islamic feminism and the attention it receives, taking a Janus-faced approach, defending and attacking it. In the process, she allows herself to be cavalier about the work of others such as myself. 
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